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Northern labour migration in Namibia became large-scale and systematized under 
colonialism, leading Ruth First to argue in the early 1960s that "In Ovamboland ... 
government is of the people, by government officials, for the labour recruiter". [l] But, in 
the first fifteen years of colonial occupation, at least, it was quite the opposite. Prior to the 
decolonization process in Namibia, when access to archives was limited, detailed scrutiny of 
the immediate period after South African occupation of Ovamboland in 1915 was difficult. 
This paper discusses two dimensions of northern labour migration between 1915 and 1930: 
firstly its causes, and secondly migrants' room for manoeuvre within the fledgling contract 
labour system. For the South African state, these translated into problems of recruitment and 
control. 
Between 1916 and 1929 there was less migrant labour than in earlier and later periods. 
Previously unused figures from the Ovarnboland administration suggest the following trends. 
Firstly, very large numbers sought work in the south during the 1915- 16 famine. In Karibib 
alone in early 1916 there were over 5,000 surplus Ovambo workers, causing the local 
magistrate to forward instructions to officials in Ovamboland not to allow any further 
migrants to come south. [2] But the migration rate after the farnine dropped, settling into a 
rate well below pre-1915 levels. Between October 1916 and November 1917 the Resident 
Commissioner (RC) registered 3,168 workers to the south [3]; but from this point on they 
fluctuated between approximately 4,000 and 5,000, except for 1920 when the numbers 
topped 7,000 [4], and 1931 when they dropped below 1,500. [5] These rates nowhere 
returned to their pre-war average level of roughly 10,000 per annum. Except in 1930 when 
depression began, they remained insufficient to meet the needs of the South West Africa 
(SWA) economy. 
Labour supply here ... fluctuates considerably according to the 
season of year, crops, native inclination, etc. and is hardly 
affected by the question as to whether there is a shortage or 
surplus at labour centres. [6] 
Underlying socio-economic relations between migrants, lineage seniors and political rulers, 
intersecting with periodic environmental pressures, induced increases in labour migration or 
its contraction. These were areas over which the South African state, like the German 
administration before it, had very little control. [7] 
The Dynamics of Migrant Labour 
Migrant labour and its origins are among the few areas of debate in Namibia's sparse 
historiography. The fact that there was no taxation (until 1929) or land dispossession in 
Ovamboland has helped to avert cruder instrumentalist approaches. Historians have tackled 
structural conditions in Ovambo social formations themselves, especially under pre-colonial 
conditions. Migrant labour from Ovambo polities in southern Angola and northern Namibia 
predated colonial control by twenty-five years. 
Clarence-Smith and Moorsom [8] attributed the pre-colonial origins of Ovambo labour 
migration to the aggravation of the processes of surplus appropriation by merchant capital. 
Involvement in long-distance trade led to debt, which caused kings and headmen (omalenga) 
to exploit internal cattle resources. In societies which were already highly differentiated, 
these extractions fell on the most vulnerable strata. One escape route from the ensuing 
"complex process of pauperization" was migrant labour. [9] 
This approach has its critics. Gordon argues that variations in migration rates cannot be 
explained by "such catch-all and mechanistic explanations" as pauperization. [l01 But 
variations are not the basic point. Clarence-Smith and Moorsom fix on one of the enduring 
sub-themes of labour migration prior to colonial occupation. Compared with central Angolan 
states which had experienced centuries of mercantilism and, over a long period, deflected 
their effects towards weaker zones, the relatively isolated Ovambo polities on the Cuvelai 
floodplain experienced merchant capital much later. Their economic reorientation occurred at 
a time of tightening colonial encirclement. They grew less and less able to project the impact 
externally; internal stress in Ovamboland brought the bigger eastern polities such as 
Oukwanyama close to fragmentation. Under new economic pressures and opportunities, 
omalenga tugged at the core of the centralized state and young men began to migrate to 
southern labour centres. [l11 Thus merchant capital was an important backdrop to labour 
migration. 
Emmett, on the other hand, has criticized Clarence-Smith and Moorsom for allegedly 
viewing ecological causation as only "contextual". [l21 Emrnett in turn slightly overstates his 
case: he neglects internal dynamics and treats the Ovambo sub-regional ecology and 
migration with too little specificity. Emmett bases his arguments on the work of Dias [13], 
but deploys no primary sources to substantiate his broad claim that the Ovambo floodplain 
experienced the same climatic trends as south-central Angola. Even when Ovambo migrated 
before 1880, they generally moved from one floodplain polity to another, except in years of 
exceptional drought which affected the entire eco-region. Only rarely did they leave the 
floodplain. Nor does "migration" automatically translate into wage-labour migration. 
Migrant labour was a new form of migration, which had more in common with raiding [l41 
or trading [l51 parties than transhumance arising from a complex of environmental causes. 
Labour migration became part of famine behaviour in Ovamboland, but only after the 
structures of migration were established, and then it was only one of many "coping 
strategies". [l61 
Climatic fluctuations and ecological crises [l71 constituted one factor triggering labour 
migration. But the causes of labour migration cannot be reduced to an environmental 
squeeze. The crucial issue was its relationship with local mechanisms of control over labour, 
in conjunction with external factors. Nor was labour migration completely detemmined by 
the nature of internal controls: migrants exercised some autonomy over whether they would 
fall in with new methods of labour deployment by elders and political rulers, or whether they 
would evade mechanisms of control. 
The paramountcy of areas of causation, whether ecological or socio-economic, is not the real 
issue: it is their interaction. A fruitful way of incorporating the historiographical approaches 
outlined above and assessing the evidence from 1915 to 1930 is to pose the question of 
causation around three axes: what caused whom to migrate when. Ecological factors are 
particularly helpful in answering the question of timing in upsurges of labour migration. 
Those who took up early migrant labour were overwhelmingly young, unmarried men. The 
German missionary Wulfhorst stated in 1904 that, among the Kwanyama, migrants were the 
"sons of poor people". [l81 At this period, and probably before, there existed a stratum of 
young men whose labour was increasingly mobilized by kings and headmen. The abolition of 
male circumcision in the initial phase of Kwanyama independence from Onkhumbi [l91 in 
the 1850s implied increased royal power over labour at the expense of household and lineage 
heads. Though the missionary did not take this into account, it was against this backdrop that 
Wulfhorst argued that kings had used young men's labour for their fighting and raiding 
bands. Wulfhorst believed that when external raiding declined due to the advances of 
Portuguese colonialism, cadets who earlier might have been "sent for war" became migrant 
labourers instead. [20] 
What reasons did young men have for becoming migrant labourers? Here the question of 
impoverishment takes on importance. The eastern Ovarnbo kings' involvement in long- 
distance trade entailed an increase in internal cattle exactions. The shrinking of lineage herds 
had been exacerbated by the rinderpest epidemic of 1897. Labour earnings that went towards 
the acquisition of cattle were part of a longer-term reconstruction of lineage wealth, in 
constant tension with the centralizing kingships. It was ground constantly fought over, for 
both lineages and the tributary states sought shares of the labour migrant's earnings. 
Numerous written sources, both primary and secondary, state that Ovambo kings transferred 
their interests in raiding and trade into labour migration, creaming off tribute from returning 
migrants. [21] But this may not always have been highly systematic. In most cases, social 
and ideological pressure rather than compulsion provided Ovambo kings with their 
"voluntary" gifts, called pandulo in Ondonga. [22] Oral historical sources suggest that 
informal presentations were the pattern. 
The purchase of cattle was the main long-term aim of labour migrancy. While wages were 
used later in the colonial era to pay for stock [23], pre-colonial migrant labourers probably 
purchased materials in the south and exchanged them for cattle. It is not clear whether a 
single journey enabled a migrant to set up his own household. Probably any cattle would 
contribute towards his matriclan's herd, from which would eventually come the cattle 
necessary for his marriage, homestead and land usufruct costs. [24] 
In this early period wages were also used to purchase clothing. These were not only exchange 
items [25] but signified status. [26] They were particularly important for the growing number 
of Christian migrants. 
Up to 1907, there were probably never more than about 1,700 Ovambo migrant workers in 
the SWA Police Zone at any one time. [27] But from 1904, the demands of the German 
economy in the south were transformed. Urgent labour demands followed expansion in the 
mining and railway sectors. In 1904 the Germans did not renew the Witwatersrand Native 
Labour Association's right to recruit in SWA. [28] The obvious palliative after the 1904-07 
Herero and Nama rebellions was to mobilize Ovambo labour. [29] Dorbritz, the German 
Consul in southern Angola, argued that while Ovamboland was not worth occupying, its 
"human material" was of "capital value". [30] German officers reached agreements with 
Ovambo rulers to allow labour recruiters access to these independent polities, and for the 
"protection" of Ovambo workers in the Protectorate proper. 
During the phase between 1907 and 1916, labour migration reached a peak not achieved 
again until the 1930s. By 1910 the annual total of migrants reaching the south had risen to 
over 9,000. [31] Emmett rightly points to the correlations between the increase in migrant 
labour and drought, famine and flooding between 1907 and 1916. [32] German recruiting 
efforts were, in fact, peripheral to these increases and, even when the Ovarnbo supplied an 
average of 10,080 labourers annually between 1910 and 1914, chronic labour shortages 
remained in the Police Zone. [33] Numbers were not the only problem. Wege shows that 
absconding and absenteeism led to such a degree of fluctuation in the work-force and low 
productivity that employers made urgent representations to the administration, who in turn 
upbraided Ovambo rulers. [34] When one German official rebuked the Ndonga king, 
Kambonde, in 1912 for his migrant subjects' absenteeism, he countered that he was 
powerless to do anything about it. [35] 
Migrant Labour 1915-30 
What is striking about evidence from the early South African colonial period is that the 
correlations between drought, famine and labour migration were much more complex than 
Emmett's analysis for the German period would imply, Inadequate recruitment in the specific 
period just after colonial occupation in 1915 was due to factors inextricably tied up with 
post-famine recovery. Reconstruction of cattle herds, in particular, required the labour of 
young men; herds were split into small units and sent off to the Oshimpolo outposts, each 
requiring two herders. [36] Agricultural cultivation, especially until the harvest of 1917, also 
tied down labour to the homestead. Accompanying this were ideologically unifying 
mechanisms such as efundula, the female initiation ceremony at whose conclusion marriage 
partners were claimed. [37] All these reconstructive activities prevented the labour of young 
men from leaving Ovamboland. Moorsom correctly argues that this was a period of 
consolidation of lineage social relations. [38] 
Shortfall in numbers at this time was exacerbated by the migrants' autonomy in the timing of 
their departure south. Colonial officials attempting to spur recruitment were dependent on the 
fate of the crops and the cycle of pastoral activity. For example, in late 1916 and early 1917, 
the Resident Commissioner (RC) advised Windhoek that "the population was now actively 
preparing the fields, and the men are reluctant to leave until these are established". [39] In 
January 1917, the Tsumeb mine found it impossible to obtain labour. Despite "acute labour 
needs in the mines", which had made a demand for 1,400 labourers in March 1917 [40], the 
bulk of the potential labour migrants were unlikely to leave "until the marula drinking and 
harvest were over". [41] 
1917, as a whole, was unsatisfactory. Again in mid-1918, the RC warned Windhoek that until 
mid- August: 
a considerable proportion of young unmarried men, who make 
up the majority of labourers from this country, will remain in 
Ovamboland for the customary bringing of cattle to the fields 
preparatory to being sent to distant outposts for the dry months. 
[421 
The recovery period from the 1915-16 famine was roughly two years. But the problems of 
labour shortage remained chronic for the Ovambo administration. The greatest check to 
labour flow appeared in October 1918; all recruitment was halted as Spanish influenza took 
grip in the territory.[43] A similar epidemic disrupted the labour flow in 1925.[44] Working 
conditions at the actual labour centres - the core grievances of labour relations - also affected 
recruitment. [45] The August 1925 strike in Otavi reduced the labour flow to a trickle. 
Returning workers stopped outgoing recruits in this case by telling them no work was 
available in the south. [46] 
Initial labour recruitment policy relied on the persuasion of collaborative Ovambo 
leaders.[47] In 1918 colonial policy towards headmen who actively recruited for the 
administration was laid out. The original proposal had been to award headmen a fee for each 
migrant recruited [48], but the RC Manning recommended that this money should be used 
instead for feeding the migrant as he walked south. The RC argued that a system of quasi- 
tribute already operated. [49] 
In Ondonga certainly the pandulo system operated as in the pre-colonial period. Evidence 
fiom Uukwambi suggests that in the 1920s extraction became increasingly stringent, 
involving a large cut of the wages or goods brought back to the n o d .  [50] Migrants who had 
been to the diamond fields were targeted in particular. One oral source alleged that migrants 
were obliged to pay the Kwambi king, Ipumbu, E l  upon their return. Clothing and knives 
were also demanded. [51] Ipumbu's extraction of "gifts" in order to purchase various items 
(including a car) must, however, be viewed in the particular context of his centralizing and 
anti-colonial chiefly grip over Uukwambi. 
During periods of political tension Ipumbu actually suspended migrants from leaving to work 
in the south. [52] Despite such bans, young Kwambi men continued to leave clandestinely to 
work in the south. They did so with the support of their kin. One oral informant described 
how, on his return from taking up a prohibited contract in the south, Ipumbu "referred to me 
as a vagabond. He said that I always wanted to escape and that I did not want to carry his 
gun." [53] 
Conditions for Kwambi migrant labour were not universally the case in Ovamboland. It 
remains difficult generally in Ovamboland to quantify the proportion of wages which accrued 
to headmen and kings, because these remained largely informal. Lebzelter assessed the 
average expenditure pattern of Ovambo migrants for the late 1920s as follows: out of an 
annual wage of R60, fully one third was spent on "purchases" and a further R8 [l01 at the 
mine store by then established in Ovambo. Aside from "taxation" or "gifts" to leaders, much 
of the remainder went on the workers' own reproduction costs. [54] 
The greatest importance must be attached to the migrant's efforts to obtain cattle. The latter 
contributed to the matrilineal herds and facilitated marriage. Ovambo bridewealth payment 
was distinct from that of other southern African societies supplying labour migrants. 
Commercialization and inflation of bridewealth, as happened in patrilineal societies suck as 
Harries describes for the Tsonga in Mozambique, were not the case with the Ovambo. [55] 
Even the pressures on the matrilineal inheritance system, characteristic of other central 
African societies entering the capitalist labour market, were relatively delayed in 
Ovarnboland. The plough, a resource of central importance in pressurizing matrilineal 
inheritance norms to shift towards direct father-son descent, was introduced relatively late in 
Ovamboland and not in widespread use before the 1940s. C561 This was probably one factor 
in capitalism's relatively slow impact on bridewealth and matrilineal inheritance patterns in 
Ovamboland. [57] This very slow seepage of capitalism into the north helps to explain the 
lower labour supply from Ovamboland between 1915 and 1930. 
The question of cattle accumulation in Ovamboland contrasts fundamentally with the Herero 
further south. Among the Herero, argues Werner, pastoralism offered opportunities for self- 
peasantization and was energetically pursued as a means of avoiding wage labour.[58] The 
Ovambo had no access to external markets to exchange cattle or dairy products. No traders 
were allowed into Ovamboland; the only exchange which could take place was through cash 
purchase of goods at the Chamber of Mines store when this was established in the late 1920s. 
[59] Commodity exchange took place internally and in kind. Moreover, the absence of 
taxation and grazing fees did not place pressure on the Ovambo to intensify commodity 
production, as occurred in the Herero case. [60] Nor did the Ovambo experience the same 
land pressures. Their experience of peripheral integration into capitalism operating in the 
central territory of SWA made the terms on which they responded to the pressures of the 
colonial economy very different from those of the Herero. 
In an attempt to tackle inadequate labour supply, a full-time recruiting agent named Cope 
was appointed by the Consolidated Chamber of Mines in 1926. The agent concentrated his 
efforts on persuading the Ndonga to migrate, as their low rate of labour migration was "out 
of all proportion for the biggest tribe of 40,000". Mission influence was blamed, as was the 
weak influence of their king. [61] 
Early 1927 saw a slight increase in the migration rate; many of the new recruits were very 
young boys increasingly directed towards farm labour. Such youthful labour had also 
emerged during the 1915-16 famine, and had been similarly allowed to take up farm 
labour.[62] Such migration suggested a weakening of social control over youths. It had 
implications for the later transformation of contract labour into a highly regular pattern in the 
lives of Ovarnbo men, for these youths became conditioned to the system from an early age. 
W31 
Fluctuations in the late 1920s continued, sensitive to developments in areas where the labour 
was directed. In April 1927 a large drop was reported from the previous month, partly due to 
harvest, but the Native Commissioner (NC) [64] speculated that it was prompted by the 
rumour that all labour was being sent to Tsumeb. [65] Overall it was noted that "Cope was 
not meeting with conspicuous success". [66] By 1927 an increasing amount of cash from 
migrant labour earnings was being spent at the store opened by the Chamber of Mines. "Up 
to the present, however, it does not appear to have made much difference to the annual totals 
of labour recruits." [67] 
The late 1920s even began to show a fairly steady decline in migrant labour. In 1928 the 
October figures were the lowest for two years; the slump in Kwanyama migrants was 
especially noticeable. This was blamed on political uncertainties surrounding the final border 
demarcation with Angola. [68] 
Colonial Control and Labour Migration 
Colonial administration at its inception depended on existing mechanisms of labour 
organization. The mandatory award to South Africa in late 1920 motivated increased efforts 
to tighten procedures and recruitment, but until the mid-1920s labour control remained 
tenuous. South African officials commented unfavourably on the weak influence the 
Germans had established over the Ovambo. [69] Moreover, the German labour system had 
provided no infrastructure for the movement of labour from the north to the Police Zone. 
Plans for the construction of a railway line between Otavi and Ondonga had been halted by 
the outbreak of hostilities in 1915 [70], never to be resumed by the South Africans. These 
were the fragile residues of the German labour system over which a handful of Union 
officials now presided. 
From 1915 to 16, officials tried to encourage migrant labour to follow the route from 
Ondangwa to Namutoni, and from there to Tsumeb. [71] This was to systematize the labour 
route south and to service Tsumeb's own labour needs. The aim was to cut the route through 
Okaukweyo and Outjo. Water and food were made available at Namutoni and on arrival at 
Tsumeb. [72] Vast distances between these points remained a discouragement. The seven- 
day joumey by foot from Ondangwa to Tsumeb was almost waterless; wild animals remained 
a real danger. [l31 
Labour's preference was to avoid Tsumeb and head for the magistracy of Karibib. [74] A 
powerful incentive was that from Karibib they could be directed to the southern diamond 
fields near Luderitz, rather than the northern mines or farms near Tsumeb. [75] Given the 
extremely long lines of administrative communication between Ovamboland and most labour 
centres in SWA, it was not surprising great loopholes existed to be exploited. 
Labour migrants were generally reluctant to submit themselves for registration in recruitment 
centres in Ovamboland, and unwilling to carry passes. [76] Angolan labourers not only 
avoided registration at Namakunde on the new South African-Portuguese border [77], but 
changed their names at the registration centre in Ondangwa to avoid detection of their 
origins. This was especially the case when Portuguese tried to impose restrictions against 
allowing Angolan labour to migrate to SWA. [78] 
By 1918 a new system of identification was proposed, using metal disks (odalate) rather than 
paper ID. In the state's position of relative weakness, officials laid blame for aberrant 
Ovambo behaviour on their experience under German masters. [79] But, despite reports by 
headmen that "people never complained of the harsh usage which formerly existed" [80], 
migrants continued to practise evasions under South African rule. 
Greatest efforts went into avoiding farm labour. Like the constant flow of information about 
the Southern Rhodesian labour market to the rural hinterlands of central Africa [81], reports 
by returning Ovambo workers affected the next wave of outgoing migrants. This intelligence 
influenced choice of work-place by Ovambo migrants and whether they would migrate at all 
that season. [82] 
Fragility of colonial recruiting efforts was revealed in local officials' cautions to employers 
against maltreatment and the turning away of unsuitable labour. There is a slight suggestion 
of the "liberalism" Emrnett has noted among central administrators [83], though in 
Ovamboland it was probably plain pragmatism, stemming as it did from a weak position. 
This is illustrated in the recommendations made by Manning to labour centres in the south 
not to turn away over-youthful 1841 or unhealthy migrants. These, if refused, might 
jeopardize the larger flow of labour by spreading word of their rejection. [85] "Bad work" 
forced on Ovambo migrants acted as one disincentive for prospective migrants who might 
follow them south. Problems were serious enough in 1917 to warrant the RC's hearing of all 
cases of alleged underpayment. 1861 
Manning also advised against efforts to break down the group formations which Ovambo 
migrants preferred, both during their journeys and at the workplace 1871, and supported the 
Ovambo prejudice against farm labour. [88] The administration's prioritization of mining 
labour requirements over farming in this period worked in favour of Ovambo labour. 
Further migrant ploys included the use of visiting passes to the south. The RC suspected 
"these natives are attempting to proceed to Walvis Bay to enter work with the Harbour 
Works" [89], avoiding the mine labour which the recruiting mechanisms favoured. In March 
1926 the NC suspended the issue of visiting passes, except in special cases. 
The final problem in the systematization of migrant labour was the administration's 
weakness in tackling desertions. The OMEG mine in Tsumeb suffered acutely from this 
problem. [90] Desertion was fairly intractable at this stage because of the difficulty in 
tracing the offenders. [91] Officials assumed most deserters lived in Angola, where no 
follow-up action was possible, but the majority of deserters may in fact have been from SWA 
territory. [92] 
1930: a Context of Famine and Depression 
Initial room for manoeuvre by labour migrants was facilitated by the territory's problems of 
labour shortage. But the effects of the world depression at the beginning of the 1930s reduced 
employment in mines. Though this implies SWA entered a decline, and the economic history 
of the ensuing decade is more complex than this, from the point of view of Ovambo migrants 
significant disadvantages appeared in the labour market at this juncture. From June 1930, 
when the first intimations of unemployment in the south emerged, Cope stopped recruiting 
for the labour organizations and for the first time the administration gave precedence to the 
labour requirements of the white farming sector. [93] The implications for labour were 
significantly lower wages, isolation at the workplace, with less scope for group action against 
exploitation and abuse. 
Because of the 1929-30 famine and state responses to it, in 1930 district administrations all 
over SWA launched road construction projects to provide labour and ensure that financial 
remittances reached famine-stricken Ovamboland. Thus the real turnaround in labour 
demand from the mining sector was initially masked by public works projects. Men seeking 
work were offered employment with the road boards. But it was an unpopular option, owing 
to low wages and the fact that food was excluded. [94] When a small amount of work 
became available again on mines in September 1930, the Southern Labour Organisation 
quickly absorbed recruited labour and road work was shunned. [95] Those who did resort to 
road labour barely contained their dissatisfaction with the conditions, leaving as soon as 
prospects in Ovamboland improved. In addition, many potential labour migrants avoided 
migrating south altogether and obtained food from their spouses and kin working on the 
Ovamboland famine relief programme, despite official prohibitions on feeding "able-bodied" 
men. 
Administrative preoccupations remained centred on control of labour, in this epoch portrayed 
as necessary to the economy of famine relief. Officials in Ovambo protested at the re- 
employment of expired contractees from Luderitz at northern mines. [96] Ovambo migrants 
also procured visiting passes to the south, "where it was quite easy for them to get passes to 
look for work on stating that they have experienced delay and must earn money to enable 
them to return home". [97] In this way they were exercising more power of choice at labour 
centres, only possible when recognized labour organizations were evaded. [98] Windhoek 
chivvied the Native Affairs staff in Tsumeb to interrogate all arriving migrants to ascertain 
who had visiting passes under false pretences. 
It was an ongoing tussle for better conditions at work in a worsening scenario of 
unemployment and choice of workplace. In addition, a new pattern of recurrent migration 
was emerging. This was partly connected with the modernization of infrastructure and the 
introduction of motorized transport between Ovamboland and the railhead in Tsumeb. It was 
also fostered by long-term pressures on the environment, exacerbated by the land squeeze in 
northern Ovamboland after the redefinition of the Angolan boundary in the late 1920s. The 
type of migrant also began to change: increasing numbers of married men were taking up 
contracts. 
In conclusion, the conjunction of these cumulative changes, crisis-related pressures and 
infiastructural modernization ensured that labour migration from Ovamboland had become 
structurally more entrenched by the early 1930s than it had been prior to 1915. This shift was 
emerging at the same time as new constraints on labour began to operate in the southern 
centres to which they migrated, most notably the prioritization of farm over mine labour. 
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